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“Gravity as a relational quality of matter in Newton’s Treatise:”​[1]​

I: Introduction & Thesis

In this paper I clarify what Newton could have meant when he insisted that gravity is a real force. I interpret Newton’s speculative treatment of gravity as a relational, accidental quality of matter that arises through what Newton calls “the shared action” of two bodies. I argue that when Newton drafted the first edition of the Principia in the mid 1680s, he thought that (at least a part of) the cause of gravity is the disposition inherent in any individual body, but that the force of gravity is the actualization of that disposition; a necessary condition for the actualization of the disposition is the actual obtaining of a relation between two bodies having the disposition. The cause of gravity is not essential to matter because God could have created matter without that disposition. Nevertheless, at least a part of the cause of gravity inheres in individual bodies and were there one body in the universe it would inhere in that body. On the other hand, the force of gravity is neither essential to matter nor inherent in matter, because (to repeat) it is the actualization of a shared disposition. A lone part-less particle would, thus, not generate a gravity field. 

I present my argument in opposition to Andrew Janiak’s influential 2007 paper.​[2]​ The view I attribute to Newton is the view that he held when writing the first edition of the Principia in the mid 1680s. My evidence for this is the original draft of “Book II” [sic] of the Principia, which was published first in Latin (1728) and shortly thereafter (1728, 1731) in two English translations as A Treatise of the System of the World (hereafter Treatise) shortly after Newton’s death (1727) and was, thus, available to most of Newton’s early readers.​[3]​ I know of no reason to deny its having been written just before the publication of the Principia. In the introduction to Book III of the Principia, Newton said he suppressed his Treatise in order to “prevent the disputes” with others’ “prejudices.” The Treatise is more speculatively metaphysical than the published version of Book III. However, it explains what Newton may have meant in proposition 69, when as the very first possibility of a physical explanation of gravity Newton lists that it may be “a result of the action of the [distant!--ES] bodies either drawn toward one another.” 

I proceed as follows. First, I present Newton’s relational account of gravity in Treatise (section II). I contrast my reading with Andrew Janiak’s reading of Newton’s “Letter to Bentley” as ruling out action at a distance (Section III). In the fourth section I disagree with Howard Stein’s account of how the gravity field is generated by a particle; I argue that a lone particle is not enough to generate a force field. 

Section II: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter

In his essay, Janiak ably demonstrates that Newton thought that a force of gravity “really exists” (130, 141); Janiak quoting the Principia’s “General Scholium”) because it is one of “the causes which distinguish true motions from relative motions” by way of the “forces impressed upon bodies” (Principia, 412; quoted in Janiak 134, note 17; see also pages 130-1, 143-6). Following Leibniz, Janiak correctly rejects an instrumentalist reading of Newton’s views on gravity (138ff).​[4]​ Nevertheless, Janiak ends up misdiagnosing some elements of Newton’s metaphysics.

In particular, Janiak ignores the Treatise entirely. There Newton distinguishes between a mathematical and natural point of view:​[5]​ “We may consider one body as attracting, another as attracted: But this distinction is more mathematical than natural.” Here, as in the “technical” contrast between the “mathematical” and “physical” of the Principia (Janiak 2007, 131ff), Newton does not deny the reality of the natural point of view. For Newton goes on to write, “the attraction is really common of either [body] to [an]other” (Treatise, 37). Newton is alerting his readers to the fact that one cannot simply infer ontology from one’s mathematical expression. In the Treatise’s next paragraph, Newton explains the “natural” perspective more fully, specifically, in terms of the attraction between Jupiter and the Sun. I quote two passages. 

“There is a double cause of action, to wit, the disposition of each body.” The action is likewise twofold “in so far as the action is considered as upon two bodies; But as betwixt two bodies it is but one sole single one” (38). 

“We are to conceive a single action to be exerted betwixt two Planets, arising from the conspiring nature of both” (39).

Note the difference between 1) the “cause of the action,” which is “the disposition of each body” and 2) the “action” (or effect) itself.  The action is i) twofold as it is upon two bodies, and ii) single as between two bodies.  This is to say a body has two dispositions: a ‘passive’ disposition to respond to impressed forces is codified in the second law of motion, whereas an ‘active’ disposition to produce gravitational force is treated as a distinct interaction codified in the third law of motion.​[6]​ 

Thus, we see that the “cause” of the action is “the conspiring nature of both” bodies. For the “conspiring” to occur, the bodies must share a “nature.” To sum up: the cause consists in the “nature” or “disposition” of two bodies (or a twofold cause, because involving two bodies), but it is one interaction or “nature.” (For my argument below it is useful that Newton thinks of the interaction itself as a ‘nature.’)​[7]​ What are caused are one interaction and two “actions upon bodies”; there are two impressed forces. As Howard Stein explains (with anachronistic language), “exactly those bodies that are susceptible to the action of a given interaction-field are also the sources of the field.”​[8]​

Janiak notes, “Part of Newton's point here is to say that the third law holds for “attractions,” just as it holds for other interactions, and to note that the “attraction” between the bodies in question is proportional to the mass of each body” (private correspondence, 11/3/06). Janiak and I agree about this much. But Janiak underestimates that Newton is offering us a radical new idea, one that he feared would encounter a lot of prejudice; here we have on offer a speculative hypothesis about the nature of matter. First, Newton emphasizes a single “action” between two bodies. (He uses the repeated “actio” in Latin.) This is, thus, a very clear description of action at a distance; applying the third law of motion is not merely mathematical statement, but action at a distance really takes place in nature. This is due to a shared quality of two bits of matter. Here Newton offers a hypothesis about the physical cause of the sort he came to reject firmly in the General Scholium. Somewhat paradoxically, the body with a ‘passive’ disposition to be attracted is part of the cause of the gravitational force. 

So, we should distinguish among a) the force of gravity as a real cause (which is calculated as the product of the masses over the distance squared); b) the cause of gravity (which is at least, in part, the masses to be found in each body); b*) “the reason for these [particular--ES] properties of gravity” (Newton in “General Scholium,” Principia, quoted in his own translation by Janiak, 129); and c) the medium, if any, through which it is transmitted. The view presented here by Newton takes a complete stance on ‘a’ and a partial stance on ‘b,’ but is silent on ‘b*’. In the Treatise, Newton is entirely silent on ‘c,’ the invisible medium, if any, to explain in what way momentum could be exchanged between two bodies. Given that he uses the language of ‘action’ and is completely silent the Treatise on the possibility of a medium of transmission, the natural reading of this passage is I) Newton’s endorsement of action at a distance with II) the start of an explanation of the cause of gravity in terms of some of the qualities of matter. 

Janiak (137) quotes Leibniz’s last letter to Clarke: “For it is a strange fiction…to make all matter gravitate, and that toward all other matter, as if all bodies equally attract all other bodies according to their masses and distances, and this by an attraction properly so called…, which is not derived from an occult impulse of bodies, whereas the gravity of sensible bodies toward the center of the earth ought to be produced by the motion of some fluid.”​[9]​ I agree with Leibniz (and against Janiak, 141) that Newton really endorsed the “strange fiction,” and I reject Janiak’s apparent willingness to accept Leibniz’s insistence (against the fiction) that a motion of some fluid must be the “cause” of gravity. Thus, while Janiak criticizes Leibniz’s argument against Newton, Janiak conflates i) treating of the mechanism or medium by which gravity is transmitted with ii) treating of the cause of the gravitational qualities of matter (see also Janiak, 136); while outside the Principia, Newton can sometimes be read this way, it appears that Leibniz is the source of Janiak’s conflation.

There are three implications of the view I attribute to Newton. First, it treats gravity (understood as a causally real force) as itself ‘produced’ by a relational quality of matter. It’s only because of matter’s special relationship to other parts of matter that it gravitates. That is, as Chis Smeenk has noted, we “need a pair of bodies for both the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ aspects of the disposition to gravitate to be in play; it is only with the pair that the ‘active’ disposition to produce force combined with the ‘passive’ disposition to respond causes an interaction that yields actual motions” (Smeenk, personal correspondence, 5/23/2008).

Second, gravity is, thus, not an intrinsic quality of a single bit of matter.​[10]​ The relation only holds between bits of matter, which are said to share a ‘nature,’ that is, a ‘disposition’ to gravitate when conjoined.’ So, gravity is intrinsic to the relation, a ‘nature,’ but not to matter itself. Because gravity is not an intrinsic quality of a particle of matter, we can grasp why for Newton gravity is not essential to matter. John Henry has argued that this is due to Newton’s commitment to God super-adding gravity to matter.​[11]​ Newton was probably eager to encourage such a reading among certain of his more orthodox interlocutors. However I read Newton as claiming in the Treatise that gravity is in matter not by, say, God’s super-addition, but rather generated by (for lack of a better term) the interaction between at minimum two bits of matter due to their shared nature, that is, mass.  The shared mass of the two particles is reducible to the distinct masses that each object possesses separately, and this may be thought to make gravity an inherent property; or, given that mass is not a relational quality, one can have the cause of gravity defined non-relationally, and gravity itself defined relationally. 

But it is only by virtue of the masses entering into an ‘interaction’ that they ‘produce’ gravity. Thus, even after creation, a lonely part-less particle of matter in the universe would not be said to gravitate. The disposition is only actualized when the universe contains at least two bodies (or a body with parts).​[12]​ So, first, when it comes to gravity, we are dealing with a relational and inessential property of matter. Second, even while we can think of ‘part’ of the ‘cause’ of gravity, mass, as intrinsic to matter, it only ‘is’ a cause when related to other masses.​[13]​  

My reading has five nice features associated with it. First, it provides an account of part of the physical cause of gravity in an ontologically sparse way, in accord with Newton’s first rule of reasoning.​[14]​ No new entities are introduced. Second, it accords with the ontological priority of matter over the laws of nature in Newton’s late cosmological query that “it may be also allowed that God is able to create particles of matter of several sizes and figures, and in several proportions to space, and perhaps of different densities and forces, and thereby to vary the laws of nature, and made worlds of several sorts in several parts of the universe” (Query 31, Optics 403-4; emphasis added). It is the relationships among the densities and forces of matter to space that accounts for the varying laws and worlds. Third, it is theologically neutral. Newton leaves room for a possible role for God (for example, as the medium, or as cause of the world), but he is not required to commit to it. 

Fourth gravity is not essential to matter because not only can we conceive that God would initially create matter without gravity, but also – and more importantly, Newton writes (in a passage also quoted by Janiak) in his comment on the Third Rule of Reasoning, “I am by no means affirming that gravity is essential to bodies . . . Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth” (added to the third edition of the Principia, 796). That is, it is an empirical discovery that the strength of gravity can vary with distance. The value of gravitational mass does not vary, what varies is the strength of the interaction. A way to make sense of Newton’s denial of having claimed that gravity is essential to bodies, is to argue that gravity follows from a relation. Against Janiak I see no textual evidence that Newton ever equated “attraction at a distance” with the claim that gravity is “essential” to bodies (128, note 5 to be quoted below in full). I also see no evidence that Newton equated gravity being “essential” to matter to it being “inherent” in matter (128, note 5). To be an “essential” quality means being a quality that is required for (or a necessary condition of) the existence of matter, while gravity being “inherent” says something about its “seat” (Principia, 407), that is, its location. McGuire puts this point nicely: “For Newton, a body can be a body without acting gravitationally” (personal correspondence, 5/10/2008). Of course were one to determine that gravity is an essential quality of body, one would also be inclined to claim it inheres in it. But it is true that Newton’s third rule also asserts that while gravity is not essential to bodies being bodies – in the sense that it is not a necessary condition to their existence (bodies could have been arranged otherwise) – it is, until we find contrary phenomenon, a universal, empirical fact that gravity is not separable from pairs/systems of bodies. In order to avoid confusion, I am not claiming that Newton argues from the universal fact of gravity to its being relational quality of matter. These are distinct points. 

Fifth, Newton is committed to the position that “the various phenomena caused by gravity are such that mass and distance are the only known salient “variables in the causal chain that involves them. We express this precisely through the law of universal gravitation, asserting that gravity is as the masses of the objects in question and is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them” (Janiak, 142). Janiak is correct to emphasize that Newton’s mathematical account places constraints on what a physical account should look like because our goal is to supplement rather than replace the mathematical account (136). But Janiak ignores that Newton is also in a position to distinguish conceptually between investigating the material cause of gravity and the medium that facilitates the interaction. We can learn things about the nature of matter, mass, without learning anything about the medium. In fact, given that post Principia the medium must have negligible mass, one should say that it has an entirely different ‘nature’ than matter. 


III: On the conceivability of local and distant action 

Janiak writes that Newton “wrote to Bentley in 1693, six years after the Principia first appeared: 
“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact . . . That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it…”

Janiak comments that Newton, thus, “forcefully” rejects “the very idea of action at a distance,” (128). In using this passage to motivate his reading of both Newton’s rejection of distant action between matter as well as Newton’s search for properties of a medium, Janiak finds himself in excellent company with Maxwell, who also uses it to carefully distinguishes between Roger Cotes’ attribution of “direct” distant action and Newton’s position.​[15]​ (Cotes was the editor of the second edition of the Principia.)

But Janiak and Maxwell quote the passage selectively. The full passage reads: 

“It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must do if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my reader” (quoted from Janiak’s edition of Newton’s Philosophical Writings, 102).

Thus, it is “inconceivable” that “inanimate brute” matter can produce action at a distance (especially) if we conceive gravity along Epicurean lines, that is, as innate, essential and inherent to matter.​[16]​  But this entirely allows other conceptions of matter with more 'active' properties (and other conceptions of gravity). ​[17]​  This is, in fact, what Newton indicates in Query 31, where he contrasts the “passive principle by which the bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted” with “active principles, such as are the cause of gravity, by which planets and comets keep their motions in their orbits, and bodies acquire great motion in falling; and the cause of fermentation,” and so on. Shortly thereafter, he lists “gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of bodies” among the “active principles” (Optics, 400-1). Newton neither asserts that matter is altogether active nor passive.​[18]​ It depends on the way we are conceiving things.

The last sentence of the “Letter to Bentley” quoted above qualifies the reading of absolutist-denial of action-at-a-distance offered by Maxwell and Janiak: Newton says that he will leave it to the reader to decide if gravity is "caused" by a “material or immaterial” "agent"!  This means that Newton does not rule out the existence of matter as an active agent or cause of gravity. It would, of course, be a contradiction in terms for “passive” matter to be an “agent”; but Newton never claims in his own voice that matter must always be passive. Newton does consistently deny that 'mere mechanical' causes or “necessity” (Newton 2004, 57) or “blind fate” (Newton 2004, 137) can explain the universe. He wants to avoid being read as an Epicurean. In the fifth reply to Leibniz, which plays a crucial role in Janiak’s argument, Clarke forcefully rejects Leibniz’s attempts to tag Newton as an Epicurean (§128-130). 

Unfortunately, Janiak uses his reading of the “Letter to Bentley” to attribute to Newton the view that action at a distance is inconceivable and, thus, that Newton relies on a (tacit) distinction between (inconceivable) distant and (conceivable) local action (e.g. “all action between material bodies must be local—on pain of there being an “inconceivable” distant action,” 143; see also 141). ​[19]​  I find no evidence in Newton for thisdistinction. Such claims by Janiak presuppose his further claim that Newton thinks distant action is inconceivable. Equally unpromising is the way that, from Newton’s explicit denial of gravity being essential to matter, Janiak moves to attributing to Newton a denial of action at a distance. But to deny that gravity is essential to matter is just to deny that gravity is necessary a condition for the existence of a lone, part-less particle, or one of the primary qualities of matter. 
 
Section IV: On the nature of the force​[20]​

My position conflicts with an influential reading of Newton. Howard Stein’s ‘field’ interpretation of gravity was offered as an interpretation of Newton’s example in the treatment of Definition 8 of the Principia, where Newton writes that “accelerative force [may be referred to], the place of the body as a certain efficacy diffused from the center through each of the surrounding places in order to move the bodies that are in those places; and the absolute force [may be referred], to the center as having some cause without which the motive forces are not propagated through the surrounding regions, whether this cause is some central body (such as the lodestone in the center of a magnetic force or the earth in the center of a force that produces gravity” or whether it is some other cause which is not apparent.” Note that Newton distinguishes the cause of the force and it in turn from gravity, offering independent support for my claim above not to conflate these. 

Stein treats Definition 8 as claiming that a single particle generates a force field in the places around it.​[21]​ But this does injustice to the fact that according to Newton it is the ‘shared nature’ that generates the inverse-square force. So, on my view it is only a pair of bodies that generates anything. 

In arguing for his field interpretation, Stein is committed to the claim that bodies generate a gravity field around them even in places where there are no other bodies. Against Stein, I argue, first, that in Definition 8, Newton does not claim that there would be an accelerative force or an accelerative measure of a gravitational force in the absence of a second body; rather, the definition of accelerative forces is given in terms the disposition of a central body to “move the bodies that are in” the surrounding places. Thus, the example following Definition 8 is quite clear that we are dealing with an interaction (or shared action). The example provides, as Ori Belkind writes, “evidence for the fact that Newton distinguished between the cause of gravity (the masses of bodies) and the force of gravity [in] the distinction between the absolute, accelerative and motive measures of the force. The absolute measure of the force is associated with the cause of the force, located inherently in the body at the center of attraction. The accelerative and motive measures can be relational,” (Belkind, private correspondence, 5/4/2008). Moreover, the whole example of Definition 8 is about weight; that is, Newton is giving a treatment of forces not in terms of their (counterfactual) impact on empty places but on places filled with matter. This fits nicely with my emphasis above on the ontological priority of matter. Finally, it is worth noting that definition 8 ends with the reminder that the “concept is purely mathematical.” So, one cannot rely on it to ascribe to Newton a field ontology.
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